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Mergers and Innovation  




Do mergers raise substantial additional issues when the parties have significant 
innovation programs? To answer this, we examine the merger-related efficiencies  
that arise only with substantial innovation, arguing that innovation-intensive 
mergers should be treated more leniently than mergers without this dynamic 
dimension. We provide guidance on evidence that might determine the magnitude 
of such efficiencies. Next, we argue that where innovation is “directed” towards a 
product market, dealing with product line overlap should allay concerns about post-
merger innovation. If research is not directed, we argue that theories of harm linked 
to the product market are unconvincing. Instead, one should look at theories of 
harms in the innovation market, which stem from the advantage in being first to 
innovate.  Such first mover advantages can be rooted in patent protection, switching 
costs or network effects. This approach helps explain some of the remedies recently 
imposed on transactions such as Dow-Dupont and Bayer-Monsanto. 
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I. Introduction 
     The goal of encouraging technological progress and the diffusion of knowledge 
across the Single market has always been part and parcel of European Union (EU) 
competition policy.
1 However, the interpretation of this mandate and the weight 
given to innovation considerations has varied over time as reflected most recently 
by mergers in mobile telephony, and chemicals.
2 Until the mid-1990s, the dominant 
                                                     
1         See article 85(3) of the Treaty of Rome, or article 101(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, O.J. (C 115, 2008), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/articles.html. 
2       See Massimo Motta & Emanuele Tarantino, The Effect of Horizontal Mergers 
when Firms Compete in Prices and Investments (2017) (CEPR Discussion Paper 
No. 11550) for a review of these cases.  Examples include Dow/Dupont 
(COMP/M.7932, OJ C297, August 17, 2016 at 8 and Commission Decision March 
27, 2017), Bayer/Monsanto (COMP/M.8084, OJ C286, August 30, 2017 at 1 and 
Commission Decision April 11, 2018), Pfizer/Hospira (COMP/M.7559 OJ C324, 
August 2, 2015 at 2 and Merger Procedure August 4, 2015), GE/Alstom 
(COMP/M.7278 OJ C139, May 4, 2017 at 2-13 and Commission Decision 
September 8, 2015), Hutchison 3G Austria/Orange Austria (COMP/M.6497 OJ 
C224 August 3, 2013 at 8-9 and Commission Decision December 12, 2012), 
Hutchison 3G Italy/Wind/JV  (COMP/M.7758, OJ C391 October 22, 2016 at 3-17 
view was that innovation incentives were enhanced by treating intellectual property 
(IP)-based market power more leniently and by accepting restrictive licensing 
clauses as long as they were seen as necessary to ensure the distribution of 
technological knowledge. While this had implications for Article 101 (then 81) and 
102 (82) cases, innovation was not a material factor in merger reviews. 
                                                     
and Commission Decision September 1, 2016), and Novartis/GSK (COMP/M.7872 
OJ C23 January 22, 2016 at 2 and Merger Procedure December 18, 2015).  
     The last twenty years have seen a notable shift in the antitrust treatment of 
intellectual property rights (IPRs).
3
 Until a recent declaration,
4 the consensus 
seemed to be that, while competition policy should not expropriate IPRs, IP-based 
dominance should be treated just like any other type of dominance. At the same 
                                                     
3        For the evolution of the technology transfer block exemption regulation, 2004 
and revision in 2014, and regulations preceding it, Commission Regulations EEC 
2349/84, EEC 556/89 and EC 250/96.  See Robert D. Anderson, Jianning Chen,  
Anne Caroline  Müller, Daria Novozhilkina, Philippe Pelletier, Nivedita Sen, & 
Nadezhda Sporush, Competition Agency Guidelines and Policy Initiatives 
Regarding the Application of Competition Law Vis-a-Vis Intellectual Property: An 
Analysis of Jurisdictional Approaches and Emerging Directions (World Trade 
Organisation Staff Working Paper ERSD 2018-02, March, 2018) for the evolution 
of attitudes over a wide range of jurisdictions, not limited to the EU.    
time, innovation has slowly crept into merger review
5
 in a series of cases, becoming 
more recently a full-fledged aspect of the process, reflecting the Commission’s 
concerns that mergers might have material systematic negative effects on 
innovation. In particular, the European’s Commission (EC) decision in Dow-
Dupont has created a vigorous controversy.  
 
                                                     
4        Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager stated that, “when we look 
at high-tech mergers, we don’t just look at whether they may raise prices. We also 
assess whether they could be bad for innovation.” Referring to the Pfizer/Hospira 
case, (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMP/M.7559, August 4, 2015) the 
Commissioner continued, “[o]ne concern was that Hospira already had a competing 
drug on the market, and we thought Pfizer might stop work on its own drug if the 
deal went ahead as planned. Which would have meant less of the innovation that 
we depend on as patients.”  See Margarethe Vestager, Competition Commissioner 
European Commission, Speech delivered at European Commission and Consumer 
Day, Competition: The Mother of Invention (18 April, 2016),   available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-
2019/vestager/announcements/competition-mother-invention.en.   
5         See remarks Vestager, supra note 7, for a review of attitudes and a preview 
of upcoming discussions on merger and innovation.   
A. The current controversy 
     The nature of the controversy has been fleshed out in a number of recent 
academic papers, authored by both academic observers and those involved in the 
Commission’s decisions.  It is useful to start with a paper by the former Chief 





     These authors draw several points out of a model that envisages a merger as a 
combination of assets among firms that can set both prices and investment levels.  
The merged firm offers multiple differentiated products upon combining the 
operations of multiple single product firms, whereas the “outsider” firms that do 
not participate in the merger continue to produce a single (differentiated) product.  
This structure attempts to capture the asymmetric nature of merger, in contrast to 
the stream of work that investigates changes in overall industry concentration and 
innovation investments.
7   
 
                                                     
6
      Massimo Motta & Emanuele Tarantino, The Effect of Horizontal Mergers when 
Firms Compete in Prices and Investments (CEPR Discussion Paper 11550, 2017).  
7
     Xavier Vives, Innovation and Competitive Pressure, 56 JOURNAL OF 
INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 3, 419-469 (2008), that provides a survey.  See also Motta 
& Tarantino, supra, note 9. 
 
     This structure also implies that innovation by one firm hurts other firms in the 
market.  As such, they find that the internalisation of such a negative externality 
means that a merger reduces incentives to innovate. As we discuss further below, 
this can be seen as the mirror image of the reason why mergers put upward pressure 
on prices so that the observation effectively translates a well-understood effect into 
a new setting. The second point is that, because a merger leads to higher price-cost 
margins it also affects the profitability of gaining sales through innovation. This 
effect is subtle, as it can work both for and against investment incentives. To see 
this, assume first that the merger increases profit margins but does not affect the 
difference between profit margins before and after innovations: because innovation 
helps to shift sales from rivals and those sales are now more valuable, the 
innovations incentives of the merged entity increase. However, there are no reasons 
to believe that a merger would increase pre and post-innovation price cost margins 
to the same extent. If the post-innovation margin increases more than the pre-
innovation margin, then there is a further merger-related boost to innovation. In the 
opposite case, this second effect decreases the parties’ investment in innovation.   
 
     The main purpose of the Motta- Tarantino paper is to investigate these trade-
offs to obtain a judgement on the overall effect, positive or negative, of merger on 
both prices and innovation.  They find that the merged firm internalises the effect 
of any price decrease of one of its products on its other product, which results in 
upward pressure on its prices relative to the case where firms did not merge.  This 
price rise lowers sales for “insiders” and this translates into lower investment 
incentives.  While outsiders’ prices tend to increase, they increase by less, which 
tends to raise their demand and investment incentives.
8
 This means that the net 
effect of the merger on the entire industry price and investment levels is a priori 
unclear; however, the authors do derive a sufficient condition for investments to 
decrease for the industry as a whole.  Large efficiency gains or large spillovers in 
research that can be internalised by the merger can, of course, overturn this negative 
view. However the authors also show that agreements which fall short of a full 
merger, such as research joint ventures, can help capture these beneficial effects.   
 
     There is therefore no reason to be lenient on mergers simply because the 
merging parties invest in innovation. In the authors’ words, “…we find no support 
for the view that a merger – by relaxing competition – might increase incentives to 
invest.”
9
  On the contrary, in the absence of innovation-specific efficiencies or 
research spillover effects, the traditional consumer harm from higher prices would 
be compounded by an additional loss of innovation, possibly at the industry level 
and not just at the level of the merged firm.  
 
     In the Motta & Tarantino set up, innovation incentives depend directly on 
product market overlap between the merging parties and result from the investment 
implications of traditional static price effects.  As pointed out by others, then, an 
                                                     
8        Furthermore, they do not increase in all cases.  
9       Motta & Tarantino, supra note 7.  
alternative view of the paper is that it implies that “a traditional static assessment 
…suffices to determine, also the impact of the merger on dynamic efficiency”
10
. 
What is needed in order to determine if investment introduces additional 
considerations for those deciding merger cases is to determine if, where the price 
effects are modest or easily remedied, there are systematic grounds that remain for 
blocking the merger based on negative effects on innovation.  This is a theme that 
we will reprise below, when presenting our own analysis and is not addressed by 
the Motta and Tarantino treatment, where investment is moderated by unremedied 
product market effects.   
 




 written by the current Chief 
Competition Economist and two senior members of his team, are both narrower and 
more general than the Motta and Tarantino treatment.  Motta and Tarantino allow 
for either process or product innovation, whereas Federico et al only allow for 
                                                     
10     Vincenzo Denicolò & Michele Polo, The Innovation Theory of Harm: An 
Appraisal,  SSRN, March 22, 2018, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3146731 at 3. 
11
      Giulio Federico, Gregor Langus and Tommaso Valletti, A Simple Model of 
Mergers and Innovation, 157 ECONOMICS LETTERS 136-140 (2017). 
12
      Giulio Federico, Gregor Langus and Tommaso Valletti, Horizontal Mergers 
and Product Innovation, 59 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 1-23 (2018).    
product innovation.  At the same time, these papers consider quite a general 
research and development (R&D) process. Each company runs a single research 
lab that innovates with some probability and where there is a large premium to 
being a sole innovator but almost none to innovating simultaneously with a 
competitor.  Effectively, innovations are modelled as substitutes in the product 
market.  Merger allows the “insider” firms to perfectly coordinate their 
commercialisation (or equivalently pricing) decisions so that if either -- or both -- 
of its labs innovate, the discovery continues to yield large profits. In turn, this means 
that any one “insider” lab can “free ride” on the success of the other insider lab so 
that in the face of decreasing returns to R&D, the insider labs reduce overall 
research effort.  In sum, the innovation effects, while they operate via innovation 
behaviour, arise because of traditional product market effects.
13
 Therefore the 
question we pose of the additional effect of innovation despite any product market 
remedies remains unanswered. 
 
                                                     
13      In this respect, we do not agree with the distinction that Denicolò & Polo, 
supra note 11 draw between the Federico et al line of work, supra notes 12 and 13 
and that of Motta and Tarantino, supra note 7.     
     Rephrasing this along the lines of Denicolò and Polo,
14
 the question posed by 
the papers we have reviewed is: should prices be allowed to rise due to a merger 
because such merger-induced price increases might help innovation?  This 
motivates their approach of investigating the additional factors that might overturn 
the negative results of this line of work.  In particular, they show that R&D 
coordination and the diffusion of knowledge across “insider” labs may well 
increase innovation incentives by allowing the merged firm to more efficiently 
manage the labs under its control or by allowing the output of one to extend to the 
entire range of output produced by the merged firm. Indeed, as we will see below, 
these factors can take multiple guises, from transfers of know-how within the firm, 
to external spill-overs, to licensing, each of which deserve to be considered 
separately. It is in the assessment of the role of such elements, to which one can 
add the sequential nature of innovation, the nature of R&D, and the role of 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) where we deem that the remaining challenges 
reside.  As a result, we make these a focus of our own work, below.   
 
                                                     
14      See Denicolò & Polo, supra note 13 and Vincenzo Denicolò & Michele Polo, 
Duplicative Research, Mergers and Innovation, 166 ECONOMIC LETTERS 56-59 
(2018). 
 
     Jullien and Lefouili
15
 combine lessons from the existing literature with insights 
from their own formal analysis to distinguish among four main types of effects of 
merger in the presence of innovation.  Their typology nests the effects already 
discussed above: the innovation diversion effect refers to the effect of one firm’s 
innovation on the profits of its merging partner, whilst the demand expansion effect 
is the increase in innovation incentives due to the merger-induced increase in profit 
margins.  As we have seen, these are the factors analysed by previous work.
16
  To 
these, the authors add the spillover effect, which reflects the internalisation of 
(positive) knowledge externalities, and the margin expansion effect, which we 
would rather call a scale effect, referring to the fact that the reduction in output due 
to the merger reduces the profitability of a fixed investment like R&D.  
 
     The last two factors complement the earlier analyses. The authors additionally 
point out that the innovation diversion effect is not necessarily negative. If, for 
example, firms invest in horizontally differentiating their products from rivals, this 
relaxes the intensity of price competition to the benefit of all firms. In this case, the 
innovation externality is positive so that a merger would likely lead to more 
innovation, not less. This is a valid theoretical point, but we will focus instead on 
                                                     
15     Bruno Jullien & Yassine Lefouili, Horizontal Mergers and Innovation (CEPR 
Discussion Paper 12773, 2018). 
16      See Motta & Tarantino, supra note 7 and Federico et al, supra notes 12 and 
13. 
the negative diversion effect as the greater policy concern.  First, we take our cue 
from the industries identified by the papers we have reviewed to find mergers where 
policy makers have struggled with innovation effects.  Such industries would 
include, and case review suggests that, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and ICT are 
where the diversion externality is likely to be (strongly) negative because 
competition-softening innovation tends not to be the form that innovation takes. 
This stands in contrast to consumer products like soft drinks or even cars, where 
innovation might be more likely to be “competition-softening” within the class of 
goods due to strong differentiation potential. Second, while a positive diversion 
effect would indeed imply that there is more innovation after the merger, it is not 
entirely clear that such an increase is positive for consumer welfare once price 
effects are taken into account. Moreover, the precise effects of a merger on this type 
of innovation are likely to be complex and depend on the precise specification of 
demand.
17 This sensitivity to the specification suggests that “positive externality” 
innovation
18
 should not be a systematic part of merger review. Finally, we note that 
positive externalities between firms can also arise in terms of pricing. For example, 
when consumers face search costs, a firm can benefit from a decrease in the price 
                                                     
17     In a one-dimensional Hotelling model, for example, the effect of a merger on 
“product differentiation” innovation would depend on   whether the merging firms 
were “direct neighbours” or not. 
18      We think that spillovers may be an exception to this statement, as we discus 
below, as it is possible to make reliable predictions in this case.  
of a rival located nearby as it draws more consumers to the area (as one might see 
in the context of a mall). In this case, a merger would lead to lower prices.
19
 The 
fact that such a positive externality may occur in certain cases is not generally taken 
to be a reason for abandoning the usual presumption that mergers tend to put 
upward pressure on prices as a default.  In the same vein, we believe that the 
presumption of a negative innovation externality between merging parties remains 
a useful default. Presumptions can always be refuted once an unusual case arises. 
 
     Hence, while we do not in any way dismiss the possibility of positive externality 
innovation, we will focus here instead on what we see as the most policy relevant 
case of “competitive innovation”, i.e. innovation that imposes a negative externality 
on rivals. In the same spirit – and reflecting another point made by Julien and 
Lefouili -- it is good practice to specify whether the arguments presented apply to 
product or to process innovation. Our own analysis refers to product innovation 
only. 
 
                                                     
19
   See Norbert Schulz & Konrad Stahl, Do Consumers Search for the Highest 
Price? Oligopoly Equilibrium and Monopoly Optimum in Differentiated-Products 
Markets, 27 RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 3 542-562 (1996). 
  
B. Our contribution 
     While the arguments presented here can be made fully rigorous, this note is more 
in the spirit of a stream of the literature that we have not yet discussed and which 
tries to isolate the main factors to be assessed when considering innovation in the 
context of merger review, without relying on a fully specified single model.
20
 We 
do, however, attempt a more pronounced “policy” orientation than these authors: 
we do not limit ourselves to identifying the main factors to consider.  Rather, we 
also discuss how to document whether these factors are likely to be important in a 
given case and further suggest a “policy algorithm” showing the sequence of steps 
that one needs to take when a given transaction might have significant effects on 
innovation.  We hope that this framework for decision making fills a gap in the 
literature, between the contributions reviewed in section 1.1 and the broader papers 
cited in this section, of capturing a relatively wide set of effects but doing so in a 
way that gives structure to decision making rather simply stating that “anything can 
happen”.   
 
     Our approach relies on three well-known elements: the conventional distinction 
between product, technology and innovation markets, the difference between 
                                                     
20
     Examples include Carl Shapiro, Competition and Innovation. Did Arrow Hit 
the Bull’s Eye? in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY REVISITED. 
361–404 (Josh Lerner and Scott Stern, eds, 2012) and Michael L Katz & Howard 
A. Shelanski, Mergers and Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 1 1-85 (2007). 
“undirected” and “directed” R&D processes and the traditional approach to dealing 
with the static effects of mergers. Our hope is that, by drawing on a comparison 
with the standard merger procedure we will be able to highlight the aspects of 
innovation that call for special attention. We also focus on what we believe to be 
the correct policy counterfactual. The relevant question is not “what are the effects 
of a merger on innovation?” it is “what are the effects of a merger on innovation 
given that the static effects of the mergers are appropriately handled by the 
Competition Authority?”  In other words, we know that competition authorities will 
(or at least should) address conventional static issues – and hence try to ensure that 
prices do not increase.  It does not, then, seem particularly useful to analyse the 
effects of merger on innovation in a framework where the merger leads to higher 
prices and where it is through those higher prices that innovation incentives are 
affected. We wish to know what additional elements innovation brings, assuming 
that the rest of competition policy works well to control already identified static 
effects.  A happy consequence is that ignoring such price effects greatly simplify 
the analysis.  
 
     The article is organised as follows. In section 2, we review the effects that 
operate through the product market as well as the types of efficiencies that might 
be weighed against any negative effect on innovation. In section 3, we turn to the 
technology market. We argue that, while the effects of the merger on the sale of 
technology should be investigated, these are not really related to the incentives to 
innovate. Section 4 analyses the potential effects of mergers in innovation markets. 
We explain why divestment of research assets, in other words divestments in the 
innovation market, might be required to implement an effective remedy for overlap 
in product markets. We then draw a sharp distinction between this type of 
intervention in innovation markets, which is still motivated by (potential) overlap 
in the relevant downstream markets and “innovation theories of harm”, which are 
not based on such overlap. These “innovation theories of harm” are based on some 
form of first mover advantage and might require the divestment of IPRs and other 
research assets. Section 5 discusses some additional aspects of the issue, including 
the relevance of the concept of ”appropriability”, which has been identified as an 
important factor,
21
 and potential harm from changes in the type of innovation 
pursued by the merged entity. Section 6 summarises our argument into a “policy-
algorithm” explaining how authorities might proceed when a merger seems likely 
to have a significant innovation dimension. Section 7 concludes. 
 
II. Product Markets 
     As mentioned above, we proceed under the assumption that the Competition 
Authority ensures that the merger does not lead to significant increases in prices. 
Product innovation leads to new or better products. To keep the discussion simple, 
we consider a situation where each firm sells a single good that can be improved 
by investing in innovation. The incentives to make such investments come from 
two sources: the hope that a better product will help gain sales at the expense of 
                                                     
21      See Shapiro, supra note 22. 
rivals
22
 and the possibility that the new product might also help expand the size of 
the market, i.e. that it will also yield additional sales that do not come from 
reductions in the sales of competitors. The relative importance of the type of gain 
is larger if the products in the market are closer substitutes. 
 
A. Incentives to Innovate 
i. The Innovation Incentives of the Merging Parties 
     Consider a merger between two firms, A and B. Before the merger, each firm 
made its own, independent investment decision by comparing the cost of 
investment to the potential gains discussed above. In doing so, firm A would not 
care that some of its additional sales would correspond to a decrease in the sales of 
its rival. After the merger, though A would take into account that part of the 
additional sales obtained because of innovation are in fact taken from the merging 
partner.
23
 This means that the net benefits from investment are lower after the 
merger. Hence, if the merging parties sell products that are substitutes in the 
product market, then a merger tends to decrease the incentives to innovate of the 
parties. 
 
                                                     
22      Or, equivalently, raise price without losing sales.  
23      This is what Jullien & Lefouili, supra note 17, refer to as the innovation 
diversion effect.  
     This line of reasoning should be familiar as it mirrors the very reason why 
competition authorities worry about the static effect of mergers on prices or 
quantities.  Post-merger, firm A would take account of the fact that some of the 
gains from lowering its price come at the expense of firm B and would therefore 
set its price higher than before the merger. Furthermore, the magnitude of the effect 
depends on the same factors in both the static and the dynamic story: mergers are 
more likely to have a sizeable negative effect if the products of the two merging 
entities are close substitutes and if profit margins are substantial. Indeed, under the 
assumption of no price change, one can easily derive a “measure of downward 
pressure on innovation”
24 which is similar to common measures of “upward 





Where 𝑝𝐴, 𝑝𝐵 are the prices of the products, 𝑚𝐵is the relative profit margin on 
product B and 𝐷𝑅𝐴,𝐵 is the diversion ratio from A to B. As Shown in the appendix, 
the equivalent for innovation investments is
25
 
𝐷𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐴,𝐵 = 𝑚𝐵𝑝𝐵𝐼𝐷𝑅𝐴,𝐵 
Where 𝐼𝐷𝑅𝐴,𝐵 is the innovation diversion ratio defined as the ratio between the 
number of units of sales lost by B and the number of units of sales gained by A 
when A spends one additional pound (or euro) on its investment in innovation. In 
                                                     
24
      This term is also used in Federico et al., supra note 13.  
25      Where DPII stands for “downward pressure on innovation investment”. 
practice, there are no reasons to believe that this diversion ratio would be very 
different from the diversion ratio used in the GUPPI formula: what matters is what 
the next best alternatives to A‘s product is, irrespective of whether this product 





     An important consequence of this parallel is that, in terms of product market 
overlap, static and dynamic harm from mergers go hand in hand: if there is no 
concern that the merger can raise prices materially, then there should be no 
concern that it would reduce innovation either. Moreover, any potential problem 
could be resolved through product divestments to reduce the overlap between the 
products of the merging parties. The appropriate remedies are the same as for 
purely static concerns: divestments in the product market to reduce the amount of 
overlap between the product lines of the merging parties. 
 
     The fact that static and dynamic harm from a merger proceed from the same 
mechanism and call for the same remedies does not automatically imply that the 
innovation aspects of a merger do not matter. The similarity only ensures that the 
harm from less innovation and higher price are similar. Two sources of harm rather 
                                                     
26
      The two diversion ratios can only differ significantly if there is considerable 
heterogeneity across consumers as to the relative weight that they put on price and 
quality. 
than one remain, however. A projected price increase of 2% might be palatable but 
a price increase of 2% and a 2% decrease in innovation might not be.  
 
     Does this mean that the “customary” GUPPI thresholds should be adjusted 
downward when innovation is also an important feature of competition in the 
industry? Not necessarily. The reason why small expected price increases are 
tolerated is that we believe that, even though these might be hard to demonstrate, 
mergers do create at least some small efficiencies that might benefit consumers. 
Hence, if the same order of “hard to measure” merger-specific efficiencies can 
reasonably be expected for innovative activities, then there are no reason to adjust 
the usual GUPPI thresholds. Indeed, if we were to believe that innovation activities 
tend to generate more “hard to measure” efficiencies than production activities, 
then we would want to use higher thresholds for an initial GUPPI-based assessment 
of the merger. We will come back to the issue of efficiency in section 2.2. below. 
 
ii. The Innovation Incentives of the Non-Merging Parties 
     When we analyse the static effects of a merger we know that the reaction of non-
merging firm is a priori ambiguous: rivals might behave less competitively than 
before the merger, compounding the elimination of competition between the 
merging parties, or they may behave more competitively and partially alleviate the 
direct, harmful, effect of the merger. We also know that these indirect effects cannot 
fully compensate for the direct effect that the merger has on the price/output 
incentives of the parties. In that sense at least, ignoring the reaction of rivals – as 
measures of upward pressure on prices do – cannot lead us to an erroneous 
conclusion as to the net effect of the merger on prices or output levels.  
     The same principles apply if –as we do, one looks at the effects of a merger on 
product innovation under the assumption that prices do not change. While the 
merger also affects the innovation investments of other parties, whether other 
parties react by increasing or decreasing their own investment is a priori unclear.
27
 
Still, even if the change in third party investment changes in the opposite direction 
from the investment of the merged parties, the sum of these changes in investment 
                                                     
27  With R&D competition, there is no strong association between the direction 
of the rival’s reaction and the nature of product market competition (e.g. quantity 
versus price setting). Instead, the direction of the rivals’ reaction depends on other 
factors such as the relative benefits of “forging ahead” of lagging rivals compared 
to those of “catching up” with leading rivals as well as on the extent of spillovers.  
See Irene Henriques, Cooperative and Non-cooperative R&D in Duopoly with 
Spillovers: Comment, 80 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 3 638 – 640 (1990). 
Moreover, one can easily find situations where some rivals would react to the 
merger by decreasing their own R&D investment, while others would choose to 
increase it. 
across third parties should fall short of fully making up for the change in the 







     On the production side, efficiencies can arise because of economies of scale 
(“spreading fixed costs” over a greater total volume) or economies of scope 
(“spreading fixed cost” over more products). It is not hard to imagine how similar 
economies might also arise for innovative activities. In particular as R&D resources 
equipment might be shared efficiently by researchers working on innovation 
relating to different products, once these products are housed under the same roof.
30
 
Unless the parties can provide convincing evidence that such efficiencies are 
substantial they are best treated as the “hard to measure” efficiencies discussed 
above, which justifies the use of customary thresholds in merger reviews. However, 
                                                     
28  See, for example, James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, Strategic 
Commitment with R&D: The Symmetric Case, 14 BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 1 
225 – 235 (1983). 
29
  See Denicolò & Polo, supra note 13, where a number of these efficiencies 
are also discussed. 
30  These types of efficiencies are best thought of as occurring in the innovation 
market. 
there are additional factors suggesting that a merger might indeed lead to an 
increase in innovation investments and/or outcomes.  
 
     These additional effects can be broken down into efficiencies and changes in 
investment incentives. Efficiencies refer to an increase in innovation outcomes for 
a given amount of investment. However, such efficiencies can also increase the 
parties’ incentives to invest. We therefore prefer to organise these additional effects 
according to the economic mechanism involved rather than use the 
efficiency/incentives distinction. 
 
i. Knowledge Diffusion within the Merged Entity 
     Assume that, post-merger, the R&D activities of the two partners are still run 
separately. In particular, there is no attempt to coordinate the type of research 
projects pursued to avoid duplication. Before the merger, the benefits from a 
successful project run by A came from A’s ability to use the innovation itself and 
whatever revenues it might get from licensing the technology to others (if this 
makes strategic sense for A). After the merger, A can still use the innovation itself 
and can still license it to outside parties. The only difference then is that now B can 
use the fruits of the innovation freely rather than get access to it at a price. 
 
     If A’s innovation was not licensed to B before the merger, then the merger has 
a clear efficiency benefit as B will be able to improve the quality of its product post-
merger. This benefit applies both to existing technologies and to future innovation. 
If A’s technology was licensed to B before the merger, there is still a merger-
specific benefit coming from increased incentives to invest. We know that IPR 
owners are typically unable to extract the full value of their technology through 
arms-length licensing. This implies that the private value of A’s innovation must 
have increased post-merger. An increase in the value captured for a given level of 
investment increases A’s incentives to invest in R&D. This is the first benefit from 
the internal diffusion of technology facilitated by the merger. This investment-
increasing effect only applies to future innovation. 
 
     How could the relevance and strength of this effect be assessed in practice? For 
the effect to be sizeable, two conditions must be satisfied. Firstly A’s technological 
innovation must also be useful for B’s product line (and conversely). Whether this 
condition holds depends on the precise nature of the products and of the innovation 
involved. Assume for example that A and B are selling petrol-fuelled and electric 
cars, respectively. If A finds a way of improving the car’s suspension, this new 
knowledge is also likely to be applicable to B’s electric car. On the other hand, any 
innovation regarding the petrol engine would be of no use to B. 
 
     The second condition is that, before the merger, A would have been unable to 
capture most of the value that its innovations might create for B. If technology 
markets work efficiently, then licensing is an effective – if still imperfect – manner 
of transferring technology. If this is the case, then one would expect the gains from 
transferring internally technology that would not have been transferred externally 
before the merger would be relatively small. On the other hand, the absence of pre-
merger licensing or evidence that arms-length licensing does not provide high 
returns to the licensor would imply that the type of merger-specific benefits 
discussed in this section are likely to be substantial. An analysis of the pattern of 






     Consider now a situation where, before the merger, part of A’s innovations 
“leaked” to its rivals, including firm B. Such leaks are referred to as “spillovers”.  
Spillovers decrease a firm’s incentives to invest because they imply that a given 
investment results in a lesser advantage over the innovator’s rivals than in the 
absence of spillovers. Assume further that the merger does not affect the size of 
these “leaks”, i.e. that it does not lead to better diffusion of knowledge to the 
merging partner. This assumption ensures that the diffusion of innovation is exactly 
the same pre and post-merger. Therefore, we do not have the benefits of internal 
knowledge diffusion already discussed above. 
 
     Before the merger, firm A’s incentive to innovate was decreased by the 
knowledge that its own effort would also help all or some of its rivals.  Assume that 
B is one of the firm that would have benefited from the spillovers. After the merger, 
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      Spillovers are also discussed in Jullien & Lefouili, supra note 19.  
firm A still suffers from the spilling out of its knowledge to remaining rival but it 
now actually benefits from the spillover to its merging partner B. Consequently, the 
larger the pre-merger spillovers to firm B, the more the merger is likely to increase 
the innovation incentives of the merged parties. 
 
     There is a subtle relationship between spillovers and the effect of internal 
diffusion of knowledge discussed in the previous section. While the effects are 
logically different – as we assessed spillovers under assumptions that rule out 
increased internal diffusion - the two sources of efficiency are related. High 
spillovers mean that the technology market does not work efficiently since the 
innovator cannot easily appropriate the value created by its innovation. So, just as 
for the internal diffusion of innovation, the less efficient the licensing market is the 
larger are the benefits from the merger.  
 
     One must also consider the interaction between spillovers and internal diffusion 
of knowledge. This is explained in Table 1. 
 
     In the first row, A can extract the full commercial value of its innovation through 
licensing. The technology should therefore be widely licensed pre-merger (no 
increased diffusion) and the merger should not increase A’s reward from innovation 
either (no incentive effect). As seen in section 1.3.1., inefficient licensing creates 
both a positive diffusion effect and a positive incentive effect. 
 
Table 1: Spillovers and the Internal Diffusion of Knowledge 
 Increased Diffusion  Increased Incentives 
Perfectly Efficient 















     In the third row we consider the polar case where rivals benefit completely from 
A’s innovation through spillovers. This means that A cannot monetise its 
innovation through licensing, i.e. complete spillovers kill off the licensing market. 
In this case the merger does not affect the diffusion of knowledge but, as explained 
in section 1.3.2., it increases A’s incentives to innovate. We now turn to less 
extreme combinations of licensing efficiency and spillovers. In row 4, there are 
incomplete spillovers. This means that licensing cannot be perfectly efficient but it 
might still enable A to obtain some additional returns from its investment. If those 
additional returns are sufficient to induce A to license to B pre-merger, then the 
merger brings no benefits in terms of knowledge diffusion. However, the merger 
still increases A’s incentives to innovate as the merged firm is able to appropriate 
more fully the benefits of diffusing the innovation to firm B. If A does not license 
to B pre-merger, then the merger also brings about an additional diffusion benefit.  
 iii. A Remark on “Appropriability” 
     Several commentators
32
 have identified “appropriability” – or an innovator’s 
ability to capture the benefits from the use of his innovation by others – as a crucial 
factor in the assessment of the effects of merger on innovation. Since the merger 
increases the innovator’s ability to benefit from the use of the innovation by the 
merging partner, greater appropriability is generally believed to decrease the 
positive effect of the mergers: if firm A can already capture much of the benefits 
from its innovation pre-merger then the merger does not improve matters much. 
This is very much in line with our analysis in the two previous sections. These 
sections can be seen as a more detailed discussion of the appropriability issue, at 
two levels. Firstly, our approach allows us to distinguish between different types of 
limits to appropriation. Appropriation is limited both by the breadth and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights (as captured by the importance of 
spillovers) and by the ability to write efficient licensing contracts, which itself 
depends on the nature of the technology
33
 and on the types of contractual clauses 
that are allowed in the relevant jurisdictions. This should make it easier to assess 
the level of appropriability in concrete cases. Secondly, we distinguish between two 
types of effects: those on the diffusion of innovation and those on the merged 
                                                     
32      For example, Shapiro, supra note 24. 
33     In particular, some technologies can be demonstrated without being revealed 
while others cannot be. 
parties’ incentives to innovate. The first type of effect applies to both existing and 




iv. Coordination of R&D Investments 
     Consider a situation without spillovers and – for simplicity – without licensing. 
Before the merger, A and B ran their own research programs in an uncoordinated 
manner. It is useful to distinguish between two polar types of research 
environments: “directed” research, where the type of innovation to be obtained is 
reasonably clear at the outset of the research program and “undirected” innovation 
where the nature of the invention is a priori ill-defined. The pharmaceutical sector, 
where research programs are often targeted at a specific condition or approach is 
an example of a (mostly) directed innovation environment, while the chemical 
sectors, where large number of computer-generated molecules might be tested in 
search of useful properties, comes closer to an undirected research environment. If 
research is largely undirected, then bringing the research programmes of firms A 
and B under the same roof does not make it easier to avoid duplicative efforts. 
Whether A and B’s R&D programs end up with overlapping results depends mostly 
on chance. By contrast, directed research investments can be organised more 
efficiently to avoid duplicating efforts. From a static perspective, such an efficiency 
only benefits the merging firm. Because the type of cost-saving involved is likely 
                                                     
34  Alternatively we might say that the first type of effect is an efficiency in the 
technology market while the second efficiency arises in innovation markets. 
to affect mostly fixed costs, these benefits are unlikely to be passed on to consumers 
to any meaningful extent. The effect of duplication avoidance on the total amount 
of R&D investment by A and B is a priori ambiguous: on the one hand, avoiding 
duplication makes every pound (euro) invested in R&D more fruitful, increasing 
the firms’ incentives to invest. On the other hand, the merged entity eliminates the 
expense from duplicating efforts, which tends to decrease total investment. 
However, as we have formally shown elsewhere,
35
 while the prospect of avoiding 
duplication has an ambiguous effect on total R&D investment, it has a positive 
effect on the expected amount of realised innovation. In other words, the parties 
might reduce total investment but the investment used for non-duplicative research 
increases post-merger. 
 
v. Sequential Innovation 
     Innovation is a cumulative process. Successive generations of products are 
introduced. Some reflect only minor improvements while others are true 
breakthroughs. In most cases, the current ability of an industry to innovate depends 
on previous innovations and accumulated experience. Such sequential innovation 
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       See Pierre Régibeau and Katharine Rockett, Mergers and Product Innovation: 
Seeds and GM Crops in GLOBAL FOOD VALUE CHAINS AND COMPETITION LAW, 
BRICS DRAFT REPORT (Ioannis Lianos, ed., 2017).  
processes have been analysed extensively in the economic literature.
36
 While the 
main focus of this literature has been on how intellectual property rights should be 
designed in order to ensure that all firms involves in the successive chain of 
innovation have sufficient incentives to invest, one can also draw some lessons 
about the impact of mergers. 
 
Consider an initial innovation obtained by A. Without this first innovation, the next 
step would not be possible (or it would be much harder to get to). Assume for 
simplicity that A itself cannot undertake the next step and that B is the only likely 
follow-on innovator. The key insight is that the first and second innovations are 
both substitutes and complements. They are substitutes because the second 
innovation makes the first one obsolete (or at least less valuable) and they are 
complements because the second innovation could not emerge without the first one. 
We can now consider two different pre-merger scenarios. 
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       See seminal work of Suzanne Scotchmer & Jerry Green, Novelty and 
Disclosure in Patent Law, 21 RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 1 131 – 146 (1990) 
and Jerry Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Division of Profits in Sequential 
Innovation, 26 RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 1 20 – 33 (1995).  The extensive 
development of these themes is reviewed in Katharine E. Rockett, Property Rights 
and Invention, in, HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION, (Bronwyn H. 
Hall and Nathan Rosenberg, eds, 2010). 
     In the first situation, both A and B can be patented but B cannot be used without 
infringing on A. For a given IPR regime, this would occur if innovation tends to be 
incremental rather than drastic.
37
 If A and B are independent firms, there are three 
potential problems. The first issue is that, in order to get sufficient incentives to 
innovate, A must get rewarded not only for the benefits that its innovation brings 
directly to consumers but also for the fact that it makes subsequent innovation (and 
hence further benefits to consumers) possible. The second problem is that, because 
B might make A’s innovation obsolete quickly, and A would anticipate this, A 
might not have sufficient incentives to invest in the initial innovation. In other 
words, A would not be rewarded for the fact that its own innovation makes the 
following innovation possible. The third issue is that B might be fearful to invest in 
the second innovation knowing that it will likely infringe A’s patents and that, if 
licensing cannot be agreed ex ante, A would set a licensing rate that might not 
reward B adequately for its own (sunk) investment. In other words, if the parties 
cannot agree on licensing terms before B invests in R&D, then B might be a victim 
of hold up since its R&D costs will be sunk when the terms of the licensing contract 
are agreed. Since ex ante licensing often is not feasible, hold up is a concern. It 
leads to insufficient investment in the follow-on innovation. Furthermore, unless 
licensing allows the initial innovator to capture the full net value of the second 
                                                     
37      This is of course a simplification. Deciding which of the two scenarios applies 
best would in practice require a careful examination of the pattern of innovation 
and patenting in the industry.  
innovation, A’s own incentives to innovate may remain insufficient. A merger 
between A and B resolves both issues if it intervenes before either firm has invested 
(i.e. this type of benefit applies only to future technologies). Therefore, if ex ante 
licensing is not feasible or the initial licensor cannot extract the full value of its  
innovation, then a merger between the two parties improves innovation incentives 




     In the second situation, B does not infringe on A’s initial IPRs. This leaves us 
with only the first two issues: the initial innovator is not properly rewarded for 
“opening up the field” with its initial innovation and this is made worst by the fact 
that the second innovation eats into the profits from the first innovation. This time, 
                                                     
38      One might think that there is a countervailing effect: as the second innovation 
reduces the value of the first one, an integrated firm might be reluctant to 
“cannibalise” its own income stream and would therefore be less eager to proceed 
with the second innovation (this is the usual “replacement effect). However, this is 
incorrect. To see this, consider a comparison between independent firms and 
merged firms under a pre-merger arrangement that guarantees the same total benefit 
for the first innovation as the benefits to the first innovation when the firms are 
merged. This means that, if it innovates, an independent firm B must make a 
payment to A for access that is at least equal to the loss due to A’s loss of business. 
Therefore, B’s incentives to innovate cannot be larger without the merger than with 
the merger. 
the beneficial effect arises whether or not ex ante licensing is feasible and perfectly 
efficient. On the other hand, there is also a countervailing effect. If A and B 
belonged to the same firm, then B would consider the fact that its subsequent 
innovation “cannibalises” the revenue flow of the initial innovation. B’s innovation 
incentives would therefore be lower within a merged firm than with independent 
companies. This creates a trade-off: a merger helps provide sufficient incentives for 
the initial innovation but might slow down follow-on innovation. 
 
     We now turn to the practical questions of when sequential innovation 
considerations should be taken into account and how the magnitude of the effects 
discussed above could at least be gauged. Clearly, the considerations above only 
applies if innovation is indeed sequential, in the sense that later innovations rely 
substantially on earlier ones. We also need A and B to have been/be/be likely active 
in the same technology area.
39 This second condition is easily verified based on 
patent data. The first condition can be checked, both for the industry as a whole and 
for the merging parties in particular, by looking at patent citation patterns. At the 
industry level, one would look at the number of citations that the main players 
make, in their own IPRs, to IPRs held by other firms. For the merging parties, one 
would look at the bilateral pattern of citations to each other’s IP. The larger the 
number of citations, the more likely it is that the effects discussed in this section 
                                                     
39     Notice that the technology area, not the overlap, between corresponding 
product markets is what matters.  
would be significant. Importantly, because the possible benefits of mergers 
discussed here apply to future innovation, there are no reason to limit the 
investigation to recent patents. On the contrary, the overall pattern of innovations 
and citations over a significant period of time would likely be more informative.  
Furthermore, one might be able to get a grip on the issue of likely infringement by 
looking at the “X and Y” classification of patent applications at the EPO, which tell 
us how likely – in the examiner’s opinion – a patent is likely to infringe on others.
40
 
Again, what matters is how often a firm’s patent might infringe the patent of another 
company, especially a patent of the potential merger partner. We will return to this 
issue when discussing legal certainty. 
 
     The final piece of evidence relates – again – to the efficiency of the licensing 
market. The better the licensing market appears to work, the less important 
considerations arising from sequential innovation are. In particular, these 
considerations would be much less relevant in industries where ex ante licensing 
appears to be common. 
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     See Georg  S. Von Graevenitz, Stefan Wagner & Dietmar Harhoff, How to 
Measure Patent Thickets – A Novel Approach 111 ECONOMIC LETTERS 1 6 -9 
(2011). 
vi. Legal Certainty  
     A distinguishing feature of intellectual property rights is that they are both 
probabilistic and vague, or at least more probabilistic and vaguer than other 
property rights. They are probabilistic
41
 because there is a significant chance that 
they would not be upheld in Court if challenged. They are vague because the object 
to which they apply – as described in the claims – leaves a significant margin for 
interpretation, meaning that infringement is itself uncertain. 
 
     These features make the process of investing in innovation, as well as the 
process of producing and selling innovative products uncertain and potentially 
perilous. It can be hard for a company to determine in advance whether its product 
might be subject to significant demands for royalties. From the other side, a patent-
holder cannot be sure of getting a material monetary return for the corresponding 
innovation. This state of affairs has two main consequences. Firstly, it can have a 
chilling effect on both innovation and sales. Secondly, it tends to lead to fairly 
frequent – and expensive – litigation. Both of these effects are socially harmful. A 
merger helps reduce uncertainty and avoid conflicts, at least in relations to the IPR 
and products of the other merging party. This is an efficiency. 
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     This concept is introduced in Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic 
Patents, 19 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 2 75 – 98 (2005). 
 
     The magnitude of this efficiency is likely to be greater in industries where IPRs 
are not easily defined – software and some branches of electronics are examples -  
than in industries like pharmaceuticals where there is much less ambiguity. The 
frequency and cost of litigation could also help us assess the importance of the 
efficiencies involved. This type of considerations matter more if the merging parties 
innovate in the same technology areas and/or have been opposed in litigation in the 
past. 
 
     Another useful measure might be the citations-based metric of potential 
infringement that we have already discussed above. Unfortunately, this metric is 
only available for EPO patents.
42
 Notice however that the overall “chilling” effect 
of uncertainty and vagueness on innovation and sales is much harder to measure. 
Assessments of the scale of efficiencies linked to increase legal certainty are 
therefore likely to be systematically too low.  
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     See Von Graevenitz et al, supra note 44.  Other metrics with wider applicability 
have been proposed, such as the semantic measure of Mateusz Gatkowski, Marek 
Dietl, Lukasz Skrok, Robert Whalen & Katharine Rockett, Prospective Patent 
Thicket Identification (University of Essex Working Paper 22928, 2018), 
http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/22928. As the title indicates, this measure 
has the benefit of being able to identify thickets prospectively.  Alternatives are 
reviewed in that paper.  
C. Product-market effects and innovation efficiencies: conclusion 
     We have argued that, once we assume that competition policy would deal 
effectively with the usual static effects of mergers and if we focus on effects in or 
mediated through the product markets, the innovative activities of the merging 
parties – and of their rivals – do not raise additional concerns. Having pointed out 
that, just as for productive efficiencies, there is likely to be scale and scope 
economies in the production of innovation that are hard to measure, we conclude 
that there is no reason for treating mergers more strictly simply because the merging 
partners have significant innovative activities. 
 
     We then reviewed a number of additional sources of potential merger-related 
efficiencies, which are specific to innovative activities, i.e. they arise because of 
the peculiar “knowledge” nature of innovation and are therefore additional sources 
of efficiencies that would not arise in the absence of innovation. While it seems 
proper to let the parties bring evidence to support such efficiency claims – and we 
indicated the type of evidence that might be needed – it seems unavoidable that 
these inefficiencies cannot be fully documented. If so, then there is an argument for 
treating mergers with a significant innovative dimension more leniently than purely 
“static” transactions. 
 
     We now turn to merger-specific issues – other than efficiencies - that might arise 
in or through the technology and innovation markets. 
 
III. Technology Markets 
     Technology markets are those where technologies are for sale, either as full 
transfers of intellectual property or in the context of licensing agreements. In the 
usual hierarchy of markets from innovation markets to technology markets to 
product markets, technology markets concern the use of technology for the purpose 
of making and selling goods and services. This is why market shares and market 
power in technology markets are customarily assessed based on the market shares 
of the corresponding goods and services in relevant downstream product markets. 
     In this sense then, technology markets have no direct bearing on how incentives 
to innovate might be affected by a merger.
43 This of course does not mean that 
competition authorities should not look the potential effects of a merger in 
technology market. It remains true, for example, that, as in any other market, 
horizontal overlap between the “product lines” of the merging parties would tend 
                                                     
43     One might be able to construct theories of harm whereby a merger would 
increase the parties’ incentives to “exclude” rival technologies and where the 
prospect of such exclusion decreases the innovation incentives of technology rivals. 
However, such theories of harm seem likely to be credible only under rather 
specific circumstances because of the difficulty of excluding a technology where a 
patent exists.  This might be viable where additional factors, such as an industry 
standard, exist but are properly ignored in our attempt to provide fairly general, 
practical policy guidance.  As we have said earlier, it would be appropriate to adjust 
from the default where special circumstances arise.    
to increase the price at which these products are made available to others. Hence, a 
merger between two parties with IPRs on technologies that are substitutable in 
some use would be a concern and might require some IPR divestment.  
 
     Complementarities between IPRs would work the other way. So called “patent 
thickets” arise when the production of a good or service requires access to 
intellectual property held by a large number of independent entities. Thickets lead 
to the well-known “Cournot” double marginalisation problem: when setting its 
licensing conditions, each IPR owner fails to consider that a higher variable royalty 
means lower sales of the product and hence lower receipts for other licensors. If 
two IPR owners merge, they take this complementarity between their respective 
IPRs into account and ask for lower royalties. While this mechanism is identical to 
the reason why mergers between firms selling complementary products are often 
thought to be benign, one should point out that this type of complementarities is 
likely to be more prevalent in technology markets than in product markets. This is 
not only because increasingly complex products tend to rely on a very large number 
of IPRs, but also because the probabilistic and vague nature of IPRs – discussed 
above – tends to create complementarities even between IPRs covering closely 
related technology.  If patents A and B cover similar processes – and so normally 
would be regarded as substitutes, the fact that their respective validity and scope 
are uncertain means that potential users might actually want to acquire rights to 
both.  In other words, they would want to treat them as if they were complements.  
 
IV. Innovation Markets 
     Innovation markets are not really “markets” since they often do not correspond 
to the sale of any products or services and – accordingly – no prices are set within 
their confines.
44
 In this sense, “innovation markets” are best understood as a stage 
in the vertical chain of activities where firms carry out a variety of research 
programs in the hope of obtaining new, commercially valuable knowledge. Since 
the intensity and efficiency of such research efforts are an important determinant of 
consumer welfare in the medium to long run, the potential effects of a merger on 
the activities of the merging parties and of their rivals are a proper focus of merger 
review. In section 2, we discussed the effects that might arise because of overlap 
between the product lines of the innovative parties. In section 3, we briefly 
examined the consequences of a merger for firms that might use the technologies 
produced by the merging parties in order to produce their own products or services. 
In this section we will mostly focus on the effects that are not triggered by well-
identified overlaps or complementarities between the product lines to which the 
results of R&D are applied.  
 
A. Are there horizontal issues in innovation markets?  
     What does it mean to say that the innovative activities of the merging partners 
“overlap”? In section 2, we argued that innovation incentives came from the desire 
                                                     
44  The one exception to this statement occurs when firms undertake contract 
work for specific research and development activities. 
to improve the sale of particular products so that innovation incentives could only 
be affected by the merger if the product lines of the two parties overlapped. Hence, 
if product line overlap is already eliminated in order to deal with traditional static 
concerns, no additional “horizontal” issues should arise in innovation markets. 
 
     However, this argument needs to be nuanced for two main reasons. Firstly, the 
link between R&D activities and the product market is not always as clear-cut as 
we have taken it to be. Secondly, evidence from the innovation market can be useful 
to help define what the relevant overlap in downstream markets might be. 
i. The Link between Innovation and Product Markets: A “Pure” 
Innovation Theory of Harm? 
     Economists and specialists in management of technology distinguish between 
two polar types of research environment.
45 Directed research refers to situations 
where a given research effort is aimed at addressing a well-defined need that arises 
in well-defined product market(s). Examples would include the search for a malaria 
vaccine or improvements in car tyres. Undirected research evokes a situation where 
the types of products to which the resulting innovation might apply is not well 
known ex ante. In its extreme form, undirected research would amount to “letting 
smart people do what they want” and then see what comes out. In practice, 
undirected research seems to be a better approximation when the commercial 
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  See, for example, Evan M. Berman, The Economic Impact of Industry-
Funded University R&D, 19 RESEARCH POLICY 4 349 – 355 (1990). 
potential of research is not a priori well defined. For example, research in battery 
technology can lead to longer lasting batteries, faster charging batteries or batteries 
relying on different active ingredients. Moreover, even if we limit ourselves to one 
of these dimensions of quality, the type of products in which the new technology 
would perform well (e.g. cars, smart phones, airplanes) cannot be identified clearly 
until the precise manner in which an improvement is achieved is known. 
 
     Undirected innovation modifies our previous analysis. While the eventual 
financial rewards to R&D will of course depend on the product markets in which 
the innovation is used, the chances that a particular R&D project would be useful 
in an area where the product lines of the two parties currently overlap can be so low 
as to be irrelevant. In such an environment, requiring the divestment of existing 
overlap in the product market would have no material effect on the innovation 
incentives of the merged entities. Static and dynamic efficiency then become 
separate issues, as addressing static concerns does not “automatically” addresses 
dynamic issues. 
 
     If horizontal overlap in innovation markets is to matter, it must work through a 
different mechanism than product line overlap.  A main such mechanism is the 
advantage of being first. Consider for example what economists refer to as “patent 
races”. Firms invest in R&D with a specific type of innovation in mind. We can 
think of this in terms of the battery example above: research is “directed” in the 
sense that it is targeted at a specific technological area; however, the link between 
this area and corresponding product markets is very weak. The first firm to innovate 
successfully obtains a patent. Unless the breadth of patent protection is very narrow, 
this means that lagging firms might find out that their own R&D efforts lead to an 
innovation that is no longer patentable (because of prior art) and/or infringes the 
patent obtained by the first innovator. There is therefore a premium on “getting to 
the technology first”. To see what this implies for the merger of two firms involved 
in similar research, consider the decision problem of one of the merging partners 
before and after the merger. Getting an innovation early is more costly than getting 
it at a more leisurely pace. By investing more in R&D, firm A increases its chances 
of getting there first. Of course, this also decreases B’s chances of winning the 
“patent race”, but A does not take this into account. After the merger, A does take 
into account the fact that increasing the speed of its R&D program decreases the 
expected return on B’s own R&D investment. This leads to a reduction in R&D 
investments after the merger and a corresponding delay in the speed of introduction 
of new technology. There can therefore very well be a theory of harm that arises in 
the innovation market and does not rely on the existence of overlap between the 
parties’ product lines. 
 
     In order to assess the relevance and magnitude of this effect, “horizontal 
overlap” is best defined in terms of the “technological areas” used by the relevant 
patent offices. In practice, then, this type of overlap ought to be assessed by an 
analysis of the long term patenting behaviour of the merging parties, relying on 
both technical areas overlaps and the prevalence of citations between their 
respective patent applications. This can be complemented with information on 
failed research projects if it is available. 
 
     A note of caution is needed. While patent races have provided fodder for a large 
number of academic papers, it is not clear that they represent actual research 
environment very well. Often, research is motivated by a perceived need rather than 
by the pursuit of a particular type of solution. Moreover, patent breadth is rarely so 
large – or so well defined – as to prevent a laggard from also protecting the fruits 
of its own research.
46
 In such cases, R&D competition does not look much like a 
race for a single prize.  However, similar overlap issues arise, even without the 
likelihood of patent infringement, if there is another source of “first mover 
advantage”. This could, for example, be lock-in effects (once users have invested 
in the early technology they are reluctant to switch) or network effects. In this 
respect then, for example, “overlap” in the innovation market would tend to be a 
relevant concern when the parties are significantly involved in areas where most of 
the value of R&D outcomes comes from their inclusion in industry standards. 
 
                                                     
46     See Nancy Gallini, The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent US Patent 
Reform, 16 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 2 131-154 (2002), for a 
discussion from both a theoretical and empirical perspective.   
ii. Remedies in Innovation Markets 
     In the polar case of fully “directed” research, divestment of overlap in the 
corresponding market is the obvious solution, as discussed in section 2. With fully 
“undirected” research, such an approach is not effective since investment decisions 
depend not on downstream overlap but on overlap in the technological areas where 
the parties undertake research. Moreover, even when there is some link between 
R&D and downstream markets, a given R&D investment might- ex ante – have 
potential applications in so many downstream markets that downstream divestment 
might not be a practical approach. When R&D is not clearly directed to specific 
downstream markets, then, we have to look at remedies in the innovation market 
themselves. 
 
     Without direct linkages to product markets, overlap in the innovation market 
only raises serious concerns if entry into these markets is impeded by the difficulty 
of accessing some inputs (see below). Otherwise, a reduction in the joint R&D 
activities of the merging parties should lead to entry. In some sectors however, 
effective research requires costly and indivisible infrastructure. It also requires 
well-functioning research teams. Because the dynamics of research teams are still 
poorly understood, such teams might also be difficult to replicate even if labour 
markets are reasonably fluid. As these types of assets might be difficult to 
reproduce for an entrant, there is a case for divesting ownership of the assets 
themselves or – in the case of infrastructure – for providing fair access to the 
relevant infrastructure. In this perspective, requiring the divestment of research 
teams – as in Dow-Dupont – can be sensible. In a similar vein, the European 
Commission insistence that GSK keep an active oncology research team after 
transferring much of its oncological activities to Novartis in exchange for its 
vaccine business, would appear to be justified. 
 
iii. Using innovation markets to help define product markets: Research 
“Pipelines” 
     In pharmaceutical mergers, it has become customary for competition authorities 
to consider the “pipeline” of the merging parties. The pharmaceutical industry lends 
itself particularly well to such an approach as the regulatory process makes it easy 
to identify different stages in the development of a new product, from the patenting 
of a new compound or method to various levels of safety and effectiveness 
assessments. What is such evidence useful for? 
 
     In Europe, the European’s Commission concerns about “pipelines” seems to 
stem from product market effects of the type discussed in section 2.  If two 
pharmaceutical companies, for example, have one drug each that is targeted at the 
same condition at some stage of the pipeline, competition authorities fear that a 
merged entity would simply decide to drop the less promising of these two research 
programs. As a consequence, competition in the corresponding market for 
treatment of the condition might end up being less competitive than it otherwise 
might have been. This type of concern is greater if both programs are in the later 
stage of development since the possible loss of competition is both more probable 
(as each project has a significant probability of succeeding) and would take place 
within a shorter-term horizon. 
 
     There is a good argument for also using the analysis of “pipelines” as a window 
on horizontal overlap in product markets. Given the uncertainty inherent in 
research, looking at overlap between current products and current innovations 
might be too narrow. A better idea of the potential overlap between merging parties 
can be obtained by looking at the pattern of investment, successes and failures over 
a significant period of time. In this sense, a snapshot of the merging parties’ 
pipeline suffices to evaluate likely, fairly immediate product market effects but a 
full retrospective is needed to assess effectively horizontal overlap over a longer 
time horizon. 
 
iv. The Commission’s Distinction between Potential Competition in 
Product Markets and “Innovation” Competition 
     In section 3.3. of the Dow-Dupont decision, the Commission distinguishes 
between “potential competition” in well-defined product markets and “innovation” 
competition. The Commission’s views are most easily explained in the context of 
the pharmaceutical industry where clinical trials go through three well-defined 
phases. The probability that a product will eventually make it to market tends to 
increase drastically from one phase to the next.  The Commission concludes that 
overlap between projects in stage III or between these projects and existing 
products creates a risk of decrease in potential competition in the relevant product 
markets while overlap between projects in phase I and II means that a merger might 
reduce competition in the relevant innovation markets. 
 
     From our previous analysis, it should be clear that this framework does not 
match ours. For us, the relevant distinction is whether or not projects in stages I 
through III are “directed” towards a specific product market or whether the markets 
on which the eventual R&D successes will prove useful are as yet rather unclear. 
In this sense, all pharmaceutical projects having reached even phase I trials are 
already linked to a potential product market and would not be relevant to what we 
refer to as an “innovation” theory of harm. Whether the chances of success of the 
trials is 50%, 10% or 0.1 %, the merger matters because these projects – if 
successful – would yield products that overlap with those of merging partner. The 
root of the problem is still product market overlap. 
 
     Of course, even issues stemming from (potential) overlap in the product market 
might require remedies farther upstream. In particular, going back to the 
pharmaceutical example, fears that the merged entity might abandon a phase II 
project that potentially competes with some of its products (or other projects)
47 can 
                                                     
47  This is a concern that has strong empirical support. See Colleen 
Cunningham, Florian Ederer & Song Ma, Killer Acquisitions, (London Business 
School and Yale School of Management working paper, 2018) 
http://faculty.som.yale.edu/songma/files/cem_killeracquisitions.pdf.  
be minimised by requiring the divestment of this project with all relevant IPRs, 
crucial personnel and essential facilities. 
 
     For us, however, such concerns are not an “innovation theory of harm”, but a 
traditional theory of harm stemming from overlap in product lines that calls for 
remedies in the innovation market. In our own framework, an innovation theory of 
harm is one that refers to the likely effect of a merger on R&D projects – already 
started or not – and that does not rely on a clear link between innovation and product 
markets. As explained above, such theories of harm may be valid when R&D is not 
“directed” or is only vaguely so. In that case, the potential harm from the merger 
comes from overlap between the type of R&D conducted by the merging parties 
and the means required to conduct such research. Here, both the source of harm and 
the required remedies are found in innovation markets themselves. 
 
     Of course, the two types of theories of harm are not exclusive. In fact, the type 
of innovation theories of harm that we have discussed above can very well work on 
top of theories of harm grounded in product market overlap: once the overlap issue 
has been resolved through appropriate remedies we are de facto back in an 
“undirected research” environment where innovation theories of harms might well 
be relevant. 
 
B. Vertical Foreclosure 
     There are also relevant markets upstream of innovation markets: the markets for 
inputs into the innovation process itself. If one or more of the merging parties has 
significant market power over the supply of some inputs and there is overlap 
between the parties in innovation markets, in the sense defined above, then 
traditional foreclosure concerns come to the fore. Such concerns would then be 
addressed by some combination of divestment of research assets relating to 
overlapping activities – as in Dow-Dupont – and mandatory licensing – as in the 
Russian Bayer-Monsanto decision.
48 Indeed, the GM crop industry provides good 
examples of how a transaction might raise foreclosure concerns in the innovation 
market. Innovation in GM Crops comes from the application of GM technology to 
specific seeds. As of 2012, Monsanto controlled 27 percent of the world’s seed 
supply. While reliable numbers per crop do not appear to be available, the share of 
ownership in a number of relevant seed market is bound to be significantly higher. 
The merger could therefore lead to a refusal to license seeds needed for rival GM 
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      See http://en.fas.gov.ru/press-center/news/detail.html?id=53029 for English 
summary of factors involved in the decision of the Russian Federal Antimonopoly 
Service.   
innovators to develop new products/new traits or to a worsening of the licensing 




V. The Direction of Innovation 
     So far, we only analysed how a merger might affect the total investment in 
innovation and the amount of distinct innovation that would arise from this 
investment. In this section, we propose extending this conventional approach to 
potential concerns about how a merger might affect the type of innovations being 
pursued. This is controversial. The profession is still divided about the aspects of 
the various Microsoft decisions dealing with the inclusion of additional features 
(explorer, browser) in the operating system as some feel that antitrust authority 
interfere with legitimate product design decisions. In this context, suggesting that 
authorities scrutinise the firm’s choice of how to allocate its R&D funds between 
various areas of research and/or various products might seem like a bridge too far. 
 
     We would certainly not recommend that the effect of a merger on the allocation 
of a given level of R&D investment be part and parcel of every merger review with 
a significant innovation dimension. However, there are specific circumstances 
                                                     
49  This concern goes beyond the need for an “experimental exemption” in 
patent law. Even if they could freely use seeds in their R&D process, rivals would 
be reluctant to invest unless they already know that they will be able to apply their 
innovation to the protected seeds to introduce a viable product. 
where such an angle would be useful. Consider for example the case of GM crops. 
The genome of crops can be modified to change or enhance some “traits” such as 
resistance to disease or pest, resistance to herbicides or drought tolerance. A lot of 
basic research has already been undertaken and there are numerous patents dealing 
with most possible combinations of traits and popular crops. By contrast, the GM 
crops that have actually been introduced in the market exhibit little variety: 
herbicide resistance and pesticide resistance are traits that have been 
commercialised much faster and much more widely than other traits – such as 
resistance to environmental stress – that might well be socially more valuable.
50
 
One explanation for this bias is that several important GM crops companies are also 
large agro-chemical producers. Herbicide resistance – for example – is not generic: 
a crop is only made resistant to a specific type of herbicide (e.g. glyphosate-based). 
By developing this specific herbicide resistance, the company therefore also 
promotes the use of its own chemicals. This complementarity biases the firm’s 
development decisions towards these particular traits. While authorities should of 
course not interfere with the firms’ ongoing product development strategies, we 
believe that ensuring that harmful market biases are not reinforced by a merger is a 
legitimate concern for the reviewing authority. After all, why worry about possibly 
                                                     
50      See Dietmar Harhoff, Pierre Régibeau, & Katharine Rockett, Some Simple 
Economics of GM Food, 16 ECONOMIC POLICY 33 264 – 299 (2001). 
 
small effects on prices if the transaction is likely to deprive the local market of 
welfare-enhancing products, as a larger, discrete effect? 
 
     The Bayer-Monsanto acquisition provides an interesting example. The 
transaction would increase the weight of the “chemical” side in a major GM crop 
company. As such, it is very likely to further decrease the company’s incentives to 
invest in developing GM crops with non-chemical resistance traits even though the 
entity owns a number of relevant patents that could block others from going 
forward. This would be a concern for economies with a significant agricultural 
sector and local growing conditions that could benefit from some specific form of 
stress or disease resistance. Russian and Brazil are two such countries. It is therefore 
interesting that Russia has imposed remedies involving the licensing of 
technologies to local firms
51 and that Brazil has urged the European Commission to 
go further in its demands. Similar issues can arise in pharmaceuticals where 
different countries have different needs and a merger might bias the future plans of 
the entity away from locally required products. 
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  The remedies include the licensing of technology specific to the agro-
climatic conditions of Russia to Russian companies,   access to the genetic data 
necessary for the development of new crops and the licensing of some crucial 
technologies (such as methods for accelerated genetic selection). 
 
     Clearly, this is an issue that requires more thought. For example, one might 
argue that any significant bias could be addressed through a form of essential 
facility argument as the company has patents that might prevent others from 
delivering the needed product. If the patents are strong enough, and the unfulfilled 
need can be documented, a traditional essential facility argument could be made. 
However, essential facility cases are notoriously hard to bring and win. One would 
therefore understand if some countries – especially those without the market cloud 
of Europe or North America – would prefer to rely on the merger review process 
instead. 
 
VI. A Policy Algorithm 
     We are now in a position to summarise the main insights of this note in terms of 
a policy algorithm, i.e. a simplified flow chart indicating how a Competition 
Authority might proceed, and what evidence should be gathered, depending on 
some identifiable characteristics of a specific case. Of course, such an algorithm 
can only provide some rather broad guidance and one should always have an eye 
for case-specific features that might require us to deviate from the suggested 
approach. However, starting from a reasonable, well-understood approach still 
seems valuable.  
 
     Figures 1.a. and 1.b. summarise our discussion in section 2. Figure 1.a. 
illustrates how dealing with static concerns should also resolve innovation issues 
linked to the parties’ incentives to compete on product design. If overlap cannot be 
handled satisfactorily, then one must consider efficiencies. At this stage, we suggest 
looking at all sources of efficiencies, including those that might arise in technology 
or innovations market. This makes it possible to get closure if these efficiencies 
prove to be insufficient. Figure 1.b. lists the main sources of efficiencies, indicating 
whether these results from cost reduction (“efficiency”) or/and from increased 
incentives to innovate. We also briefly mention the main factors affecting the likely 
magnitude of these efficiencies and the type of evidence that would be relevant to 
their assessment. Figure 2 summarises technology market considerations and figure 
3 provides guidance for the analysis of innovation market effects covered in 
sections 3 and 4. 
 
 
Figure 1. a. Product Market Analytical Structure 
 Figure 1.b. Product Market Analytical Structure: Sources of Efficiencies 
 
Figure 2. Technology Market Analytical Structure 
 Figure 3. Innovation Market Analytical Structure 
 
VII. Conclusion 
     In the wake of the Dow-Dupont decision, the debate about the role of innovation 
in merger review has been intense, sometimes even acrimonious. There is no good 
reason for this: the recent academic contributions prove to be remarkably 
compatible. For example, there seems to be little doubt that allowing mergers to 
lead to higher prices because this increases innovation incentives is a bad idea. 
Where the authors differ is in the type and number of other factors included in the 
analysis. Clearly, the overall effect of mergers on innovation cannot be the same if 
one also considers R&D coordination, diffusion of knowledge, sequential 
innovation and/or legal certainty. 
 
     In this perspective, we hope that this paper can contribute to the debate on three 
fronts. Firstly, in exchange for mathematical formality we review the economics 
behind a more extensive set of factors that are likely to influence the effect of 
mergers on innovation than any other recent papers. Having as complete a list as 
possible is important if we are to deal effectively with mergers across a variety of 
innovation-driven industries. Moreover, the list of potential innovation-specific 
efficiencies is rather long. While such efficiencies should of course be assessed on 
a case-by-case basis, the sheer number of channels through which they operate 
suggests that mergers are more conducive to efficiency gains in industries where 
innovation is an important driver of competition. Secondly, these different factors 
are organised around a few well-known economic and legal concepts: (pecuniary 
and knowledge) externalities, scale effects, appropriability and the distinction 
between product, technology and innovation markets. Thirdly, we move beyond a 
conceptual discussion to suggest types of evidence that might be useful to the 
assessment of the merger. We also propose a “policy algorithm” to help guide both 
antitrust authorities and parties to navigate the complexities of merger-specific 
innovation issues. Clearly, this algorithm is not supposed to be a rigid set of rules. 
Rather, we provide a framework intended to facilitate incorporation of the insights 
of the literature into current decision-making. We are certain that further 
discussions will modify some of our recommendations. Indeed, our own thinking 
is likely to evolve as new arguments are made and new cases reveal unexpected 
difficulties or new approaches. 
 
     A central theme of our analysis is that we need to distinguish between innovation 
effects that are grounded in (potential) product market overlaps and those that are 
not.  Even though the first type of effect might require some divestment in 
innovation markets, this type is very similar to traditional static efficiency concerns 
and can be handled by remedies that reduce downstream overlap. By contrasts, one 
can build reasonable theories of harm that operate entirely within innovation 
markets. We have argued that such theories of harm are best understood in terms 
of “undirected” research and that they arise when R&D is characterised by 
significant first-mover advantages in technologies. Remedies typically involve the 
divestment of IPRs, of research teams, research facilities or other essential inputs 
into the R&D process. 
 
     Finally, we suggest that competition authorities should pay attention not only to 
the effect of mergers on the level of innovation but also to the type/direction of 
R&D efforts. We know that this is controversial but believe that this is a debate 
worth having. 
 
